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EXTENDING THE CONSTITUTION TO
REFUGEE-PAROLEES
Since 1975 the parole authority has been utilized to admit
over 160,000 Indochinese refugees into the United States. The
Supreme Court has ruled that parolees have no inherent
rights under the Constitution. This Comment rejects the ap-
plication of the Court's rulings to aliens paroled into the coun-
try as members of mass refugee groups-such as the Indo-
chinese. Finding that the refugee-parolees are clearly distin-
guishable from the parolees contemplated by the Court, the
author contends that refugee-parolees are entitled to some
constitutional rights. The Comment concludes by calling for
judicial and congressional action to expand the constitutional
status of refugee-parolees to one equivalent to permanent resi-
dent aliens.
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1975 South Vietnam wavered on the brink of
capitulation before the communist onslaught. Concern grew within
the United States government for the safety of American citizens and
dependents still living in Indochina.' There was also fear for the
safety of those Indochinese citizens considered to be potential vic-
tims of communist reprisals because of their connections with the
United States government.2  The United States successfully
evacuated almost 55,000 of these Indochinese.3
They were not, however, the only victims of the communist victory.
With the defeat of the anti-communist regimes in South Vietnam,
1. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 56-58 (1975) (statement of Ambassador L. Dean
Brown, Director, Interagency Task Force, Department of State).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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Cambodia, and Laos, thousands of Indochinese refugees fled their
homelands. After the fall of Saigon, the United States plucked over
69,000 Indochinese from the sea.4 These refugees became people
without a country. Faced with a decision between returning the
refugees to Indochina or accepting responsibility for them, the
United States chose the latter.
5
On April 21, 1975, President Ford directed the Attorney General to
invoke the parole authority' to admit into the United States over
130,000 refugees evacuated by the government from Indochina.7 This
was not the end of the refugee problem. The exodus from Indochina
has continued. Thousands continue to flee the communist oppression.
Refugee camps in Thailand are swelled.8 Several thousand refugees
have begun a nomadic existence on the small boats used to escape
Indochina.' Governments in and about Indochina have refused to let
these "boat people" even temporarily enter their countries."0 As a last
resort, some of the boat people have attempted the perilous three-
month voyage to Australia to seek refuge.1 The rest continue to drift
about, searching for a haven while nearly every government in the
world absolutely refuses to aid them. 2
Out of concern for these helpless refugees, the United States has
sought to continue its refugee program. President Ford ordered the
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970).
[the Immigration and Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act]. The
section gives the following description of the parole authority:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such condition as he may prescribe for emer-
gent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any
alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of
such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when
the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney Gener-
al, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to
the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall
continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.
7. Gardner, Congress Nears Final Action on Vietnam Aid, 33 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 835, 839 (1975).
8. On July 15, 1977, 79,846 refugees were in refugee camps in Thailand. The
majority, 67,536, was Laotian, with 10,971 from Cambodia and 1,339 from Viet-
nam. San Diego Union, Jul. 16, 1977, pt. A, at 1, col. 2. Refugees continue to
arrive in Thailand at the rate of 500 a month. Los Angeles Times, Jun. 2,1977, pt.
I, at 12, col. 1.
9. San Diego Union, Jul. 4, 1977, pt. A, at 1, col. 3.
10. Id.
11. Los Angeles Times, Jun. 27, 1977, pt. I, at 18, col. 1.
12. San Diego Union, Jul. 4, 1977, pt. A, at 1, col. 3. The United States govern-
ment has been working hard to encourage other countries in Asia to aid the boat
people, but the governments in Japan, Taiwan, and other Asian States have
steadfastly refused to allow the refugees to have even a teinporary haven in
their countries. Only Australia and a few Western European countries have
allowed the refugees to emigrate. Id.
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parole of 11,000 more Indochinese in 1976.13 President Carter has
directed that another 15,000 refugees be paroled beginning in late
1977.1' These latest parolees are to include 7,000 of the boat people.
15
These three successive paroles of mass Indochinese refugee groups
have raised many new legal questions regarding the Indochinese
refugee-parolees.' 6 The most significant issue concerns the constitu-
tional status of these individuals, which is the subject of this
Comment.
In the 1957 case of Leng May Ma v. Barber,7 the Supreme Court
ruled that an alien admitted into the United States under the parole
authority had not entered the country. 8 As a consequence of this
holding, the Indochinese refugee-parolees stand to be denied signifi-
cant constitutional 9 and statutory rights that attach to aliens only
upon entry. The various other subgroups" of aliens are entitled to
certain of these rights based upon the determination that these sub-
groups have entered the United States.
Should Leng May Ma v. Barber" be interpreted as applying to the
Indochinese refugee-parolees? Should the Indochinese continue to be
denied constitutional and statutory benefits based on the legal fic-
tion of entry?22 If not, to what rights should the refugee-parolees be
13. Id.
14. Id., Jul. 16, 1977, pt. A, at 1, col. 2.
15. Id.
16. Members of political refugee groups which are admitted into the United
States under § 212(d)(5) of the I. & N. Act will hereinafter be referred to as
refugee-parolees, as distinguished from other parolees who will be referred to
as standard parolees. Excepted from this classification of standard and re-
fugee-parolees are those refugees allowed conditional entry into the United
States under I. & N. Act § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7) (West Supp. 1977).
These conditional entrants are discussed in Note, Refugees Under United
States Immigration Law, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 528 (1975). Standard parolees
include all aliens paroled into this country not as members of a mass refugee
group. See text accompanying notes 192-96 infra.
17. 357 U.S. 185 (1957).
18. Id. at 189.
19. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1957); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (parolees have no constitutional
right to due process, but receive only that due process which Congress grants to
them); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925); Wong Hing Fun v. Esperdy, 335 F.2d
656, 657 (2d Cir. 1964) (parolee is one who is "outside" the United States and is
not entitled to assert rights under the Constitution). See also text accompanying
notes 37-86 infra.
20. The subgroups of aliens include permanent resident aliens, nonimmig-
rant aliens, and undocumented aliens. See text accompanying notes 30-36 infra.
21. 357 U.S. 185 (1957).
22. The legal fiction of entry is that while the refugees are physically present
entitled? Must future refugee-parolee groups face this same dilem-
ma? These are some of the major issues this Comment will address.23
THE RIGHTS GAP BETWEEN PERMANENT RESIDENTS
AND PAROLEES
The Plenary Power of Congress to Control the
Admission of Aliens
The Supreme Court has long held that an alien 4 seeking admission
into the United States for the first time has no constitutional right of
entry.25 Thus, the alien is outside the reach of the Constitution and
can assert no rights under it.26 In essence, the Court has taken a
hands-off .policy toward aliens seeking admission and has abdicated
power in this area of law to Congress, 27 noting that "[c]ourts have
long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamen-
tal sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political de-
partments largely immune from judicial control."28 The Court ex-
pounded this principle in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei,29 noting that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Con-
gress is, it is due process as far as the alien denied entry is con-
cerned."
Entry
An alien's entitlement to constitutional protection is based upon
his making an entry into the United States." The degree of constitu-
tional protection to which the alien is entitled is determined by the
type of entry made by the alien. Three primary forms of entry may be
made by an alien. First, an alien may be lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence.31 An alien making this form of entry is generally
entitled to the broadest protection afforded an alien by the Constitu-
within the United States, they are legally treated as if they were not Within the
country. See id.
23. See generally Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indochi-
na Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1975), for a discussion of the use and
misuse of the parole authority.
24. The term alien means any person not a citizen or national of the United
States. I. & N. Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1970).
25. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
26. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Kaplan
v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
27. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
28. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
29. Id. at 212.
30. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953);
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1957).
31. The definition of an alien "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is
found in I. & N. Act § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1970).
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tion.3 2 Second, an alien may be admitted into the United States for
nonimmigrant purposes.13 Normally, nonimmigrants are admitted
for the purpose of a temporary sojourn. Examples are tourism or
study at a university. The third category of entrant aliens includes
undocumented aliens.34 These aliens generally enter the United
States by crossing the border without inspection. Aliens in both the
second and third entrant categories are entitled to protection of the
Constitution but to a slightly lesser degree than that-enjoyed by,
permanent resident aliens.3" All three groups are entitled to greater
constitutional protection than that enjoyed by parolees under exist-
ing law.36
Rights of Resident Aliens
Upon making an entry the permanent resident alien enjoys most of
the rights and protections of citizens under the Constitution. The
alien, as an individual under the Constitution, is entitled to protec-
tion under the Bill of Rights3 and through the twin safeguards of due
process and equal protection under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.3 8 Permanent resident aliens are covered by the Civil Rights
Act.39
In addition, the permanent resident alien enjoys a number of other
significant constitutional rights. The permanent resident alien has
the right to earn a livelihood;4" he has the right to the same procedur-
al safeguards as citizens in criminal prosecutions, civil litigation, and
administrative proceedings;4 1 and he has the right under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment not to be unreason-
ably discriminated against in the areas of state employment,4 2 wel-
32. See text accompanying notes 37-46 infra.
33. See I. & N. Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15) (West Supp. 1977), for
definition of an alien admitted into United States for nonimmigrant purposes.
34. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1957); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1952).
35. See text accompanying notes 57-67 infra.
36. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1957); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex Tel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1952).
37. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
38. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
40. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
41. Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
42. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
fare,43 tuition grants to state universities," admission to the state
bar,45 and commercial licenses.46
The area where the alien's constitutional rights are most severely
restricted is deportation. Unless he becomes a naturalized citizen,4"
the resident alien has no vested constitutional right to remain in the
United States. Like any other alien, he is subject to expulsion for
certain designated types of misconduct. 8 Significantly though, the
resident alien is still entitled to procedural due process in the expul-
sion proceedings.49 This includes the right to a fair, impartial hear-
ing."0 Upon being expelled, the alien is generally entitled to be de-
ported to a country of his choosing, provided that country will accept
him and the Attorney General does not object.
51
In the area of statutory rights, permanent resident aliens are enti-
tled to qualify their relatives for preferential treatment in immigrat-
ing to the United States.52 Statutory rights denied to permanent
resident aliens include the right to vote in public elections53 and the
right to be employed by the competitive federal civil service.54 Per-
manent resident aliens are also subject to exclusion proceedings
upon attempting to re-enter the United States.55
Rights of Nonimmigrant'A liens
Nonimmigrants are generally entitled to the same constitutional
43. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
44. Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1972).
45. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
46. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 419 (1948).
47. For the requirements of naturalization, see I. & N. Act § 316, 8 U.S.C. §
1427 (1970).
48. Id. § 241(a), 8 U.S.C.A. 1251(a) (West Supp. 1977).
49. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1905).
50. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). For other procedural
safeguards statutorily required in expulsion proceedings, see I. & N. Act §
242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
51. I. & N. Act § 243(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1970).
52. Id. § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977). A familiar relation-
ship with a permanent resident also qualifies the immigrant for an exemption
from the labor certification requirement. Id. § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(14).
53. Voting qualifications are fixed by the states, subject to federal authority
to prevent discrimination against citizens. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Presently, no aliens can vote. See 1 C. GORDON &
H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.38 (rev. ed. 1976). All
aliens, including permanent residents, nonimmigrants, and undocumented
parolees, are barred from holding publicly elected office as well; but this is a
constitutional, not a statutory denial. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; Id. art. II, § 1.
54. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1976). See
Comment, Federal Civil Service Employment: Resident Aliens Need Not Ap-
ply, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171 (1977).
55. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). See Comment, Exclusion and
Deportation of Resident Aliens: The Re-entry Doctrine and the Need for Re-
form, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 192 (1975).
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rights as permanent residents.5 6 Statutes, however, dictate some no-
table restrictions. Nonimmigrants are entitled to remain in the
United States for a temporary period, at the end of which the alien
must leave the country.5 7 Conditions of stay, such as a bond, may be
placed on the nonimmigrant to insure that he leaves the country
within the time limit assigned to him. 8 The alien must maintain the
nonimmigrant status under which he was admitted. 9 Finally, the
nonimmigrant may not engage in employment without permission
from the district director of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.6" The nonimmigrant is subject to deportation rather than
exclusion proceedings once he is within the United States.6 In this
last respect, nonimmigrant aliens receive treatment identical to that
given permanent aliens.
6 2
Rights of Undocumented Aliens
An alien who enters the United States without proper documents is
generally entitled to the same constitutional rights enjoyed by per-
manent resident aliens.3 There are, however, three major exceptions.
The undocumented alien must have been resident in the country for
"some time" in order to earn the protection of the Constitution. 4 The
alien is not entitled to seek employment,6" nor may he adjust his
status to permanent resident without first obtaining the proper docu-
ments.66 Like permanent residents and nonimmigrant aliens, the en-
trant undocumented alien is subject to deportation rather than ex-
clusion proceedings.67
Rights of Parolees
All the basic constitutional rights that resident, nonimmigrant,
and undocumented aliens possess are premised on the alien having
56. The major difference is that in most cases nonimmigrants are statutorily
denied the right to work while permanent residents are constitutionally granted
the right to work. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
57. The nonimmigrant who overstays his allotted period is subject to expul-
sion. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2) (1970).
58. Id. § 214(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (1970).
59. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(c) (1976).
60. Id.
61. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1970).
62. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
63. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
64. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950).
65. I. & N. Act § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(14) (West Supp. 1977).
66. See note 205 infra.
67. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (West 1970).
made an entry into our country.68 Parolees, however, by virtue of the
Court's ruling in Leng May Ma v. Barber,69 have made no entry. To
make an entry, the parolee must adjust his status to that of perma-
nent resident.70 The grant of parole carries no constitutional rights
with it.
71
The parole grant may be restricted, with the parolee limited to
residing in a specific geographic area.72 The Attorney General may
revoke the parole without either notice" of a hearing74 if he feels the
parole is no longer in the public interest or that the parolee had
become excludable. 75 Revocation may occur without the Attorney
General informing the parolee of the reasons for the revocation.
76
Upon revocation of parole the alien becomes subject to exclusion
rather than deportation proceedings.77 This consequence is signifi-
cant, for exclusion proceedings carry even fewer procedural due
process safeguards than deportation proceedings. 78 The alien is not
entitled to a full procedural due process hearing to determine his
admissibility but only to an essentially fair proceeding. 9
In addition to narrower procedural safeguards, the substantive
grounds for exclusion are broader than those for deportation.80 Upon
68. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1957).
69. Id.
70. Id. For adjustment of status procedures, see note 205 infra.
71. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
72. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees, supra note 1, at 100 (statement of
James Greene, Deputy Commissioner, Immigration and Nationality Service),
73. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (1976).
74. Id. Contra United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir.
1958). The court found that a hearing on the revocation of the refugee-parolee's
parole was constitutionally required. This case has presented the only exception
to the rule that parole may be revoked without a hearing. But see text accom-
panying notes 169-76 infra.
75. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (1976) provides that "when in the opinion of the district
director ... neither emergency nor public interest warrants the continued pres-
ence of the alien in the United States, parole shall be terminated upon written
notice to the alien and he shall be restored to the status which he had at the time
of parole.
76. Id.
77. I. & N. Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (1970). Upon revocation of
parole, the alien is treated as if he were applying for admission and is therefore
subject to exclusion rather than expulsion proceedings.
78. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 236.2 (1976) with I. & N. Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1970).
79. See United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967).
Not being entitled to a hearing means the alien may not produce witnesses,
conduct cross examination, or avail himself of other advantages of a full
administrative hearing.
80. Compare I. & N. Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1970) with id. § 241(a), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 1977). In Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185
(1957), the Supreme Court held that a parolee, unlike an alien in an expulsion
proceeding, could not invoke I. & N. Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970), which
authorizes the Attorney General to withhold deportation of any alien "within
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a finding that the parolee is excludable, the parolee has no right to
administrative review if he has been excluded for reasons of disease,
mental illness, or national security.81 If the parolee's appeal for ad-
ministrative review is rejected by the administrative board, the
parolee can still seek judicial review by filing a petition for habeas
corpus or declaratory judgment in a federal court.82 But the court
will address itself only to reviewing whether the administrative
board committed a flagrant abuse of discretion.8 3 Absent such a
finding, the alien will be excluded and sent back to the country from
which he came;84 unlike the deported entrant alien, the parolee is not
sent to the country of his choice.8" Thus, the parolee faces a rather
precarious existence in the United States.
Some rights have been specifically granted to or permitted the
Indochinese refugee-parolees by Congress, such as the right to work
8 6
and its parallel duty to pay taxes." By statute they may obtain
the United States" to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
subject to physical persecution.
81. I. & N. Act § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1970).
82. See id. § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a); Browell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S.'180,
184 (1956).
83. Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715,719 (2d Cir. 1966); Wan Ching Shek
v. Esperdy, 304 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (D.C.N.Y. 1969).
84. I. & N. Act § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1970).
85. Id. § 243(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a).
86. The Indochinese were originally permitted to work on an ad hoc basis.
They were not to be released from the refugee camps "until a responsible
volunteer agency has furnished assurances of housing and employment or care
and support." H.R. REP. No. 197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975). The Indochinese
were classified as employment-authorized on their 1-94 entry documents. The
1976 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which were enacted
after the parole of the Indochinese, exempt refugees admitted as conditional
entrants under § 203(a)(7) from the labor certification requirement. I. & N. Act §
212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(14) (West Supp. 1977). 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (1977)
presently exempts from labor certification those parolees who have been con-
tinuously present in the United States for at least two years. This new regulation
confuses the status of parolees who have not been physically present for two
years. Under the original ad hoc approach, these parolees were clearly exempt
from labor certification. It is not clear if the regulation supercedes the ad hoc
approach and denies these parolees the right to work. See note 205 infra for a
discussion of labor certification and adjustment-of-status to permanent resi-
dent, and the possible effect of 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) upon these adjustment proce-
dures. It should be noted that nonimmigrant or nonresident aliens are generally
not permitted to seek employment while in the United States. 1 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.6(b) (rev. ed. 1976).
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1977), which states the broad application of
what constitutes an alien who is present within the country for taxation pur-
poses.
government benefits which were enacted to aid the Indochinese ref-
ugee-parolees. 88 The refugee-parolees may stay indefinitely-bar-
ring revocation of parole-without attempting to change status to
that of permanent resident.89
Refugee-parolees have been granted certain other rights under
international treaty,9" but not under the Constitution. These include
the rights of ownership of property,9' freedom of association, 2 access
88. See note 155 infra. The state of California has also passed an act which
enables refugee-parolees to qualify for resident status in the state educational
system. Residency carries with it reduced tuition. Formerly, refugee-parolees
were excluded by CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22855 (West Supp. 1977):
A student who is an adult alien shall be entitled to resident classifica-
tion if he has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence in accordance with all applicable laws of the United States;
provided, that he has had residence in the state for more than one year
after such admission prior to the residence determination date for the
semester, quarter or term for which he proposes to attend an institution.
Id. § 22855.5 was added in 1976 to prevent refugee-parolees from being excluded
from residency status. The new section reads as follows:
A student who is an adult alien shall be entitled to resident classifica-
tion if he is a refugee who has been granted parolee status or indefinite
voluntary departure status in accordance with all applicable laws of the
United States; provided that he has lived in the state one year.
This section shall be operative only until June 30, 1980, and as of that
date is repealed.
89. To adjust status to permanent resident the refugee-parolees must follow
the standard status or entry procedures set out in note 205 infra. The reason for
requiring compliance with these procedures is the fact that a parolee is con-
sidered never to have entered the country by virtue of Leng May Mav. Barber
and is treated as if he was at the border applying for entry as a permanent
resident. A parolee who is unable to adjust his status to that of permanent
resident by the standard statutory procedure must remain a parolee indefi-
nitely. The parolee cannot be returned to his homeland. See note 90 infra. It
may be possible to deport a parolee to any third country that would accept him
on the terms of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968).
90. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968), which incorporates the substantive provi-
sions of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150. The Convention defines a refugee as any person who
[o]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
The Convention stipulates that any Contracting State that accepts a refugee into
the State must accord the refugee the same treatment as is accorded to aliens
generally. Most importantly, the Convention contains limitations for the expul-
sion or deportation of refugees: No refugee shall-except in the case of serious
criminals or persons constituting a danger to the security of the country-be
expelled or returned in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
91. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577 art. 12 (1968).
92. Id. art. 15.
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to courts,9 3 welfare,94 administrative assistance in diplomatic repre-
sentation,96 freedom of movement, 97 identity papers, 98 travel docu-
ments, '9 and transfer of assets.0 0
The Need for Narrowing the Rights Gap Between
Permanent Residents and Refugee-Parolees
The dichotomy between the rights granted resident aliens and
those granted refugee-parolees is illogical for three reasons. First,
previous refugee-parolees have been stranded in this country perma-
nently because few other countries possess the inclination or re-
sources to absorb any significant number of the refugees. 10' Second,
the United States is barred by international treaty from sending the
refugees back to Indochina until the safety of the refugees can be
assured.0 2 Third, under present regulations, it would take well over
93. Id. art. 16.
94. Id. art. 23.
95. Id. art. 21.
96. Id. art. 25.
97. Id. art. 26.
98. Id. art. 27.
99. Id. art. 28.
100. Id. art. 30.
101. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees note 1 and text accompanying
notes 7-15 supra. The reluctance of other countries to accept Indochinese ref-
ugees has been well documented. In June, 1977, a full two years after the fall of
Saigon, over 80,000 Indochinese refugees remained stranded in refugee camps
in Thailand and throughout Southeast Asia while awaiting resettlement. San
Diego Union, Jul. 16, 1977, pt. A, at 1, col. 2. Refugees continue to arrive in
Thailand at a rate of over 500 a month. Los Angeles Times, Jun. 2, 1977, pt. I, at
12, col. 1. Many of the refugees are refused even temporary permission to land in
most Asian countries and must exist in boat communities, often drifting from
country to country. Id. Only the United States, France, and Australia are con-
sidered to have significant refugee programs. Id. One group of 66 Vietnamese
were plucked from the sea by an Israeli ship. Other ships had refused to aid
Vietnamese in their floundering crafts. Once aboard, the refugees were denied
permission to land anywhere they sought refuge, including the United States,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan. The United Nations could not aid the refugees.
Finally Israel, with its bitter refugee history, allowed the refugees to immigrate.
Id., Jun. 27, 1977, pt. I, at 1, col. 4.
102. See note 90 supra. Accounts from newly escaped refugees from Indo-
china confirm the real possibility of physical peril awaiting returning refugees.
Los Angeles Times, Jun. 27, 1977, pt. I, at 1, col. 4. Furthermore, in light of the
present political situation and the past history of communist revolutions, a safe
return of the refugees to their homeland seems improbable in the future (the
brief, elected government of President Allende in Chile is the only significant
example of a communist government being overthrown by non-communist op-
position). There is always the chance that some of these regimes may guarantee
the safe return of all refugee-escapees to their homelands, but to date there has
b en no known reliable assurances given that returning refugees will not be
persecuted.
twenty-five years for all the refugee-parolees to adjust their status to
permanent resident.1 3 Because both permanent residents and ref-
ugee-parolees are certain to remain in the United States permanent-
ly, it seems unjust that both groups do not enjoy the same constitu-
tional status. 104
Parole Authority Background
Parole was first developed in the 1920's as a non-statutory, discre-
tionary administrative device.'05 The parole authority took statutory
form in 1952,106 but the concept remained the same as in the pre-
statutory period. Parole was utilized to temporarily allow individual
aliens into the United States for humane considerations or matters of
public interest.107 The parole authority allowed immigration officials
to circumvent the restrictive immigration statutes" 8 by allowing the
temporary admission of aliens who lacked valid visas or were other-
wise excludable. The dominant characteristic of the pre-1956 statu-
tory and non-statutory uses of parole was that parole was invoked
only in cases of individual hardship, and not for refugee groups.'
Strong evidence exists showing that Congress firmly intended that
parole be invoked only on behalf of individuals when enacting the
parole statute in 1952.110
103. For the present adjustment-of-status procedure, see note 205 infra.
Under this procedure, a maximum of 5,100 Indochinese could adjust their status
each year. Realistically, however, the actual number to adjust will be lower, due
to competition from other refugees.
104. For a discussion of equating refugee-parolees with permanent resident
aliens, see note 204 infra.
105. In re L-Y-Y, 9 I. & N. Dec. 70, 71(1960); Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The
Dilemma of the Indochina Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 175 (1975).
106. I. & N. Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970). For text of the section,
see note 6 supra.
107. Examples include the following: paroling aliens for medical treatment,
see United States ex rel. Lam Hai Cheung v. Esperdy, 345 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1965);
avoiding the holding of aliens in prison pending their exclusion, see Kaplan v.
Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and enabling the parolee to qualify for naturaliza-
tion or adjustment of status in a limited number of cases, to defend criminal
actions and to testify for the government in criminal cases, [1950] INS ANN, REP.
49, 50.
108. See I. & N. Act 8H 201-203, 8 U.S.C.A. 88 1151-1153 (West Supp. 1977). For
an explanation of the restrictive immigration quota system, see note 205 infra.
109. See [1950-1952] INS ANN. REP.
110. See House Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, Study of Population and Immigration Problems, 88th Cong,,
2d Sess., ser. 13, at 160 (1964) (statement of Congressman Michael Feighan).
Congressman Feighan stated: "It [the parole statute] was intended as a remedy
for individual hardship cases, no more, no less." He further noted that the use
of parole for admitting large groups of people was not contemplated: "I know at
the time we were thinking of individuals in distress rather than any group." Id.
at 133 (emphasis added). See also id., ser. 14, at 66, 67 (1963); Comment, Refugee-
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In 1956 President Eisenhower became the first president to alter
the statutory and administrative concept of the parole authority by
paroling refugees from the Hungarian uprising."1 The President took
advantage of the flexibility inherent in the language of the statute to
effectuate the parole, using the phrase: "The Attorney General may
in his discretion parole into the United States [aliens] temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or
for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest."" 2 By his action
President Eisenhower set the precedent of using the parole authority
to admit mass refugee groups into the country for the purpose of
permanent residence. 13
Leng May Ma v. Barber
This parole of the Hungarian refugees by President Eisenhower set
the stage for the Court's 1957 decision in Leng May Ma v. Barber."4
In Leng May Ma a native of China was paroled into the countr to
settle her disputed American citizenship claim. Upon a determina-
tion of the validity of her claim of citizenship, she was ordered
excluded. The parolee tried to fight the exclusion by attempting to
invoke section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act."' The
Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indochina Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175
(1975).
The intentions of Congress in creating the statutory parole authority were set
forth in the Joint Committee Report. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted in [1952] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1706 (emphasis added),
which stated in part:
The provision in the instant bill represents an acceptance of the recom-
mendation of the Attorney General with reference to this form of discre-
tionary relief. The committee believes that the broader discretionary
authority is necessary to permit the Attorney General to parole inad-
missible aliens into United States in emergency cases, such as the case
of an alien who requires immediate medical attention before there has
been an opportunity for an immigration officer to inspect him, and in
cases where it is strictly in the public interest to have an inadmissible
alien present in the United States, such as, for instance, a witness for
purposes of prosecution.
The statute, while not specifically excluding mass refugee groups, used the
singular phrase "an alien." Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the
Indochina Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175, 178-79 (1975).
111. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 615 (2d Cir.
1958).
112. I. & N. Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (West 1970) (emphasis added).
113. See Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Naturalization of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
13, pt. 2, at 485 (1964), for Congressional approval (via the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees) of the President's application of the parole authority to
admit the Hungarian refugees.
114. 357 U.S. 185 (1957).
115. I. & N. Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
statute authorized the Attorney General "to withhold deportation of
any alien within the United States to any country in which in his
opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution. .. .
The Court stated the issue as being "whether the granting of tempo-
rary parole somehow effects a change in the alien's legal status."'
1 1
The Court held that the parolee was ineligible to invoke section 243
because she was not "within the United States." As a parolee, she
had never entered the United States.1 18 Not having entered the
United States, the parolee could not be within the United States for
the purposes of the statute, despite the parolee's physical presence
within the country. The court's reasoning is reflected in the following
statement:
The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through
which needless confinement is avoided while administrative proceed-
ings are conducted. It was never intended to affect an alien's status,
and to hold that petitioner's parole placed her legally "within the
United States" is inconsistent with the congressional mandate, the
administrative concept of parole and the decisions of this Court.
Physical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule, and is
generally employed only as to security risks, or those likely to ab-
scond .... Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an
enlightened civilization.
19
Taken in conjunction with the pre-statutory uses of parole and
Congress' non-consideration of refugee-parolees in enacting statu-
tory parole,120 the Court's reasoning with respect to standard
parolees is clear.'' The key considerations are the temporary nature
of the admittance, the avoidance of needless confinement at the
border while trying to gain a visa or settle a claim of citizenship, and
the humane and convenient aspects of the whole administrative pro-
cedure.'22 The Court had no trouble finding lack of entry and subse-
quent lack of entitlement to constitutional rights because the admit-
tance was only temporary. 2 3 The temporary parolee is entitled to
nothing but humane treatment.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. 357 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 189.
119. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
120. See note 110 supra.
121. The Court's rationale was as follows: Detaining a sick alien at the border
for lack of a visa would be inhumane. Therefore, the alien is released from
detention and paroled into the country to receive American medical treatment.
Upon completion of the treatment, the alien is returned to the border. The alien
is admitted for a definite, temporary period for a humane purpose or a purpose
affecting the public interest. Upon completion of the purpose the alien leaves
the country. His presence is only temporary and is at the discretion of the
Attorney General because the alien has no right of entry.
122. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1957).
123. Id.
[VOL. 15: 139, 1977] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF LENG MAY MA TOWARDS
REFUGEE-PAROLEES
The Court's reasoning that the parolee never enters because his
presence within the country is temporary confirms the inapplica-
bility of Leng May Ma to refugee-parolees. Refugee-parolees are not
temporary visitors to this country.1 4 Certainly the convenience and
humanitarian aspects of the Court's reasoning in Leng May Ma apply
to refugee-parolees, but it is the permanent presence of refugee-
parolees that distinguishes them from standard parolees. 2 Political
refugees are usually permanent, or at least indefinite invitees. 16
Inviting refugees from communist countries to live in the United
States is a foreign policy decision made by the President,' logically
with full awareness that the refugees will remain as permanent resi-
dents. 8 That these refugees will be able to return home safely or find
another country willing to accept them is unlikely.'2 9 In essence, the
refugee-parolees have been invited here to remain as de facto perma-
nent residents, yet without the constitutional protections granted
permanent residents.
The Leng May Ma Court clearly overlooked the existence of the
Hungarian refugee-parolees. This is evidenced by the Court's several
references to the temporary nature of parole. 3 ° The manner in which
the Supreme Court framed the issue presented in Leng May Ma
succinctly illustrates this point: "Our question is whether the grant-
124. Refugee-parolees are stranded in this country until they themselves de-
cide to return to their homeland. This is mandated by the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968).
Because the United States may deport a parolee only to the "country whence he
came," the government is precluded by the Protocol from deporting the parolee.
I. & N. Act § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1970). Other countries are welcome to offer
refugee-parolees the opportunity to come and live there, but these invitations
have been minimal. See text accompanying notes 6-15 supra. Previous refugee
groups, such as the Cubans and the Hungarians, have been allowed to perma-
nently resettle in the United States. See text accompanying notes 146-154 infra.
125. See note 124 supra.
126. Id. Refugee-parolees are by definition political refugees. See note 16
supra.
127. The President, at his discretion, directs the Attorney General to parole
foreign refugees into the country as part of the United States foreign policy
objective to aid oppressed peoples from around the world. See United States ex
rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1958) and text accompanying
notes 6-15 supra.
128. See notes 90 & 102 supra.
129. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees, note 1 and note 90 supra.
130. 357 U.S. at 188, 190 (1957).
ing of temporary parole somehow effects a change in the alien's legal
status."'' By overlooking the existence of the Hungarian refugee-
parolees, the Court effectively laid down a blanket rule. The rule
blurred all distinctions between standard parolees and refugee-
parolees, 32 and resulted in a lumping together of all parolees into a
single, constitutionally-bereft class. This result was not rational.
Refugee-parolees are the utter antithesis of standard parolees.
It is not readily apparent why the Court blurred the distinctions
between standard parolees and refugee-parolees by laying down an
all-inclusive rule. Possible explanations include mere inadvertence
or calculated neglect. A third reason may be that Leng May Ma was
heard by the lower courts before the full consummation of the parole
of the Hungarians."' Both the lower courts and the parties were
therefore unaware of the constitutional plight of refugee-parolees.
Until the parole of the Hungarians, there were no instances of a
parole of a mass refugee group." 4 Thus, the issue of the constitu-
tional status of refugee-parolees simply did not exist at the time Leng
May Ma was heard by the lower courts. By the time the appeal
reached the Supreme Court, the parole of the Hungarians had been
put into effect. 135 The timing of the appeal of Leng May Ma to the
Supreme Court followed too closely to the Hungarian parole to allow
the refugee-parolee issue to crystallize and thereby be injected into
the appeal.
Congressional Reaction to Leng May Ma
One year after Leng May Ma, Congress was so convinced of the
Hungarian refugee-parolees' permanent status within the United
States that it enacted legislation allowing the Hungarians to uni-
formly adjust their status to permanent resident." 6 Congress thereby
effectively exempted the Hungarian refugee-parolees from the con-
stitutional restrictions imposed by Leng May Ma."17 Congress may
131. Id. at 188.
132. See note 16 supra. The Court's ruling in Leng May Ma pertained to all
aliens paroled under § 212(d)(5).
133. The parole of the Hungarians commenced after October 23, 1956, and
extended into 1957. Swing, Hungarian Escapee Program, 6 1. & N. REP. 43 (1958).
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Leng May Ma was rendered on February 5,1957.
The original action commenced in the United States District Court sometime
before then. The Hungarian parole was still in its formative stages during the
above court actions.
134. See [1940-1952] INS ANN. REP.
135. Leng May Ma was argued on May 20, 1958 and decided on June 16, 1958.
357 U.S. 185 (1957).
136. Act of Jul. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419.
137. As a permanent resident, an alien is no longer subject to exclusion
proceedings while he is in the country. Instead, he becomes subject to expulsion
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have been trying to negate the Court's lumping together of standard
parolees and the Hungarian refugee-parolees.
Presidential Rejection of Leng May Ma
The Leng May Ma Court stated that "to hold that petitioner's
parole placed her legally 'within the United States' is inconsistent
with the congressional mandate [and] tle administrative concept of
parole . ..""' This statement may have been valid before the Hun-
garian Revolution, but certainly not in the aftermath of the upris-
ing.139 Several presidents have repeatedly demonstrated that the
"administrative concept of parole" includes using the parole author-
ity to admit mass refugee groups into the United States for perma-
nent resettlement. 40
In 1956, President Eisenhower paroled over 30,000 Hungarian
refugees' 4' into the United States. In 1959, the United States partici-
pated in the World Refugee Year where the President announced that
the country would accept refugees from around the world.'42 In the
1960's, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson paroled over 650,000 Cuban
refugees 143 into the country. In 1962, President Kennedy directed the
parole of a large group of Chinese refugees from the Peoples' Repub-
lic of China. 44 Over 1,500 Ugandans of Asian descent were paroled by
President Nixon in 1972 and 1973. 14 Finally, there was the parole of
Indochinese refugees into the United States.
proceedings in which the alien is entitled to a full procedural due process
hearing. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). If the permanent resident leaves the United States,
he may, under certain circumstances, be subject to exclusion proceedings upon
his re-entry. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
138. 357 U.S. at 190.
139. See text accompanying notes 146-54 infra.
140. Id.
141. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 612 (2d Cir.
1958).
142. Presidential Proclamation of Dwight D. Eisenhower, May 19, 1959, [1960]
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3127-28. Congress approved this policy by
passing the Fair Share Refugee Law Act of Jul. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74
Stat. 504, which specifically authorized granting parole to large refugee groups.
143. Bernsen, Rights of Refugees, 52 INTERPRETER RELEASES 407, 409 (1975).
See also [1970-1974] INS ANN. REP.
144. House Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Comm. of
the Judiciary, Study of Population and Immigration Problems, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., ser. 13, at 106 (1964).
145. [1973] INS ANN. REP. 5.
THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION CONCEPT
The past acts of the United States government 146 in allowing the
mass Hungarian and Cuban refugee groups to enter the country for
the purpose of permanent resettlement created a presumption that
future mass refugee-parolee groups would receive similar treatment.
History had shown that "the congressional mandate and administra-
tive concept of parole"'147 of mass refugee groups flowed towards
treating the groups as if they had entered as permanent resident
aliens.148 The enactments of uniform adjustment-of-status legisla-
tion4 9 for the Hungarians'" and Cubans' confirms this fact.
Certainly, the government has the right to rebut this presumption
of admission for permanent residence. Congress could manifest an
intent to treat a subsequent mass refugee-parolee group as being only
temporary parolees, thereby invoking the Leng May Ma doctrine.
15 2
In the matter regarding the parole of the Indochinese, various
avenues existed by which the United States government could have
rebutted the presumption. When ordering the parole of the Indochi-
nese, President Ford or Congress could have set at least three pos-
sible express time limits on the duration of the parole.1 13 He could
have granted parole for a specified number of days or years, at the
expiration of which the refugee-parolees remaining in the country
would be excluded. A second form of deadline could have been the
146. These acts consisted of granting the refugees the option to remain per-
manently within the United States and also to adjust their status from parolee to
permanent resident without having to follow the very restrictive standard
adjustment-of-status procedure. For an outline of the standard adjustment-of-
status procedure, see note 205 infra.
147. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1957).
148. Enactment of adjustment-of-status legislation in favor of particular re-
fugee groups indicates an understanding by Congress that the refugees will
remain permanently in the United States. The refugees should therefore not be
arbitrarily denied constitutional and statutory benefit by virtue of the standard
restrictive adjustment statutes which would bind many of the refugees to
parolee status for an unreasonable length of time. Uniform adjustment-of-
status legislation allows the refugees to almost immediately adjust their status
from parolees to permanent residents, if they so desire, and thus by-pass the
standard adjustment procedure.
149. See note 148 supra.
150. The Hungarians had their status adjusted by the Act of Jul. 25, 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419. Also, the World Refugee Year refugees had their
status adjusted by the Act of Jul. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504.
151. The Cubans had their status adjusted by the Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161.
152. The Leng May Ma holding states that parolees are in the United States
only temporarily and have made no entry. Consequently, they do not qualify for
the protection of the Constitution.
153. The President merely directed the Attorney General to invoke I. & N. Act
§ 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970), which sets no definite time limit on the
length of the parole of a refugee.
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granting of parole to the refugees with the condition that Congress
enact adjustment-of-status legislation within a certain time period.
If Congress failed to act within that time period, the refugee-parolees
would be excluded. A third express time limit could have stipulated
that all refugees who had not adjusted their status to that of perma-
nent resident by means of the existing statutory procedure within a
specified time would be excluded.'
The Government's Failure to Rebut the Presumption
Congress and the President failed to set any express-or even
implied-time limits on the length of the three paroles of the
Indochinese. There is other evidence that the government failed to
rebut the presumption of admission for permanent residence.
Resettlement Aid
The enactment of congressional resettlement aid for the Indochin-
ese refugee-parolees' 55 indicates that Congress failed to rebut the
presumption. Rather than enacting legislation granting the In-
dochinese a time limit on their parole, Congress chose to grant them
money for resettlement. Congress thus acquiesced to the grant of
indefinite parole and indeed helped the Indochinese prepare for
indefinite parole by giving them financial aid to smooth the transi-
tion of the Indochinese into American society.
15 6
Dispersal of the Refugee-Parolees
By seeking to spread the resettlement of the Indochinese through-
out the United States, the government is showing that it wants to
blend the refugees as smoothly as possible into American society. 1
7
If Congress intended to allow the Indochinese refugee-parolees to
remain within the country only for a definite temporary period, then
154. This approach would not violate the U. N. Protocol as long as the refugee
is not forced to return to his homeland against his will. See note 90 supra.
155. The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-23, 89 Stat. 87 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2601) (West Supp. 1977), as
amended by Act of Jun. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-313, 90 Stat. 691, provided
$455,000,000 for emergency assistance for transportation, temporary mainte-
nance, and resettlement of the refugees from South Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos; the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-24, 89
Stat. 89, as amended by Act of Jun. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-330, 90 Stat. 773,
provided $485,000,000 in special assistance to refugees.
156. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees, supra note 1, at 24-25.
157. Id.
the refugee camp'58 approach would have been much more effective.
It would have been far simpler to round up and exclude the Indochi-
nese upon the expiration of their parole if the refugees were concen-
trated in one area. Spreading the refugee-parolees throughout the
country would be illogical if Congress had planned to keep them in
the country only a short period of time.
Labor Authorization
Aliens admitted for temporary or nonimmigrant purposes are gen-
erally prohibited from seeking employment within the United
States.'59 However, aliens admitted for the purpose of becoming
permanent residents are authorized to seek such employment.8 ' By
authorizing the Indochinese refugee-parolees to work, the President
indicated he was treating the refugee-parolees in the same way as
those aliens admitted for the purpose of becoming permanent resi-
dents and not in the same category as those aliens admitted for
nonimmigrant purposes.
161
THE PAKTOROVICS "INVITEE" APPROACH
There is a third argument for finding that the Indochinese refugee-
parolees have made a legal entry into the country and are therefore
entitled to the protection of the Constitution. In United States ex rel.
Paktorovics v. Murff,162 a Hungarian refugee-parolee was granted a
hearing on the revocation of his parole. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit noted that parolees were normally treated as not
being "within the United States" and were not protected by the
Constitution; therefore they were not entitled to a revocation hearing
within the meaning of the fifth amendment.' 3 This case was differ-
ent, however. Citing the circumstances under which the Hungarian
refugees were paroled into the United States, the court found this
case to be sui generis. The court's reasoning was that when the
United States invites political refugees into the country, they come
158. The refugee-parolees were originally kept in refugee camps at places
such as Camp Pendleton, California.
159. I. & N. Act § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(14) (West Supp. 1977); 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.1(c) (1976).
160. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
161. The distinction to be drawn here is that an alien who is allowed into the
country for a temporary specific purpose, such as tourism, pursuant to I. & N.
Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15) (West Supp. 1977), has no need or right to
work unless the reason for coming to the United States is to perform some
special job. Aliens here for permanent resettlement, however, do have a right to
work because they cannot be expected to remain permanently without earning a
livelihood. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
162. 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
163. Id. at 613.
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under the protection of the Constitution-at least, for purposes of
revocation of parole.'
The court found the Hungarian refugee-parolees to be "invitees"
on the basis of President Eisenhower's directives to offer parole for
the refugees.'6 5 The court found the invitation to be pursuant to the
announced foreign policy of the United States, as formulated in the
presidential directive of December 1, 1956:166
The eyes of the free world have been fixed on Hungary over the past
21/2 months. Thousands of men, women, and children have fled their
homes to escape Communist oppression. They seek asylum in coun-
tries that are free. Their opposition to Communist tyranny is evidence
of a growing resistance throughout the world. Our position of world
leadership demands that, in partnership with the other nations of the
free world, we be in a position to grant that asylum.
167
The court went on to note congressional endorsement of the extraor-
dinary presidential action through the enactment of legislation aid-
ing the Hungarian refugee-parolees.1 68
Paktorovics has been distinguished and limited by the courts. 6 9 It
has been the only occasion where the Attorney General's power to
revoke parole without a hearing has been held invalid as violative of
fifth amendment due process requirements. The reason for the
courts' limiting of Paktorovics to its own special facts is the precise
reason that Paktorovics applies to the Indochinese refugee-parolees:
Paktorovics dealt with refugees who were members of a mass
group.
70
The case of Ahrens v. Rojas17 1 highlights this vital distinction. In
164. Id. The court held that "in order to bring section 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(d)(5), 'into harmony with the Constitution,' a hearing is required to the
revocation of parole ......
165. 260 F.2d at 614.
166. This directive was referred to in a message from the President of the
United States to the Congress, January 31, 1957. The message stated in part:
On December 1, I directed that above and beyond the available visas
under the Refugee Relief Act-approximately 6,500 in all- emergency
admission should be granted to 15,000 additional Hungarians through
the exercise by the Attorney General of his discretionary authority
under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; and that
when these numbers had been exhausted, the situation be reexamined.
103 CONG. REC. 1355 (1957).
167. 260 F.2d at 613 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 614.
169. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §
2.54 (rev. ed. 1976).
170. Id.
171. 292 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1961).
Ahrens, a Cuban who had been paroled into the United States fol-
lowing the collapse of the Batista regime sought a hearing on the
revocation of his parole. He cited Paktorovics as precedent for grant-
ing a hearing to a refugee-parolee. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit denied the refugee-parolee's claim to a hearing on the revoca-
tion of his parole. The court held that Paktorovics did not apply in
this case because Paktorovics was limited to its own special facts.
The factual difference between Paktorovics and Ahrens was that the
refugee parolee in Ahrens had been individually paroled into the
country on January 1, 1959-several years before the United States
government began paroling Cubans into this country as a mass re-
fugee group. 17 2 Paktorovics could not apply because'the refugee-
parolee in Paktorovics had been paroled into the country as a mem-
ber of a mass refugee-parolee group.
Where other courts have declined to follow Paktorovics and grant
a parole revocation hearing,7 3 the parolee involved has been either a
standard parolee or a refugee-parolee who was not a member of a
mass refugee group. 7 4 There have been no further cases involving
members of mass refugee-parolee groups. There is an explanation for
this. The Hungarian, World Refugee Year, and Cuban refugee-
parolees had their status legislatively adjusted to that of permanent
resident very soon after their parole.7 5 As permanent residents, these
refugees are no longer subject to exclusion proceedings. The refugees
are now subject to expulsion proceedings 176 which demand a full
172. This program began in 1961. House Subcomm. on Immigration and Nat-
uralization of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Study of Population and Immigra-
tion Problems, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 106 (1964).
173. Among the courts in this category are courts from the Second Circuit-
the circuit in which Paktorovics was decided.
174. See Lam Hai Cheung v. Esperdy, 345 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1965) (involving a
standard parolee whose medical parole had expired); Wong Hing Fun v. Esper-
dy, 335 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1964) (confining Paktorovics to its special facts in a case
involving two Chinese sailors who were paroled into the country for shore leave
and who were therefore standard parolees); Stellas v. Esperdy, 250 F. Supp. 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (affirming Paktorovics' applicability where a member of a mass
refugee-parolee group was concerned, but finding that the petitioner was a
temporary-and therefore standard-parolee and was not entitled to a parole
revocation hearing); Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, 193 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1960)
(distinguishing Paktorovics and limiting the case on the ground that the parolee
came into the country upon the passage of a congressman's private bill on the
parolee's behalf and therefore was not a member of a mass refugee-parolee
group).
175. See notes 150 & 151 supra. The Hungarians began arriving in 1956 and
had their status adjusted in 1958. The World Refugee Year refugees began
arriving in 1959 and had their status adjusted in 1960. The Cubans began arriv-
ing in 1961 and had their status adjusted in 1966.
176. I. & N. Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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procedural due process hearing. 7 7 Thus, there has been no reason to
invoke Paktorovics. The Indochinese refugee-parolees, however,
have not yet had their status adjusted, and the holding in Paktoro-
vics should be applicable to them.
To bring the Indochinese refugee-parolees under the holding in
Paktorovics, it is clear that they must have been "invited here pur-
suant to the announced foreign policy of the United States.' ' 8 As
suggested by Ahrens, the government's invoking of section 212(d)(5)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of a mass refugee
group signifies an invitation pursuant to announced foreign policy.
179
Congressional approval of this executive action can be found in the
various bills passed which granted aid to the refugee-parolees."'c
Members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees were con-
sulted by the President and the Attorney General prior to the grant of
parole, and these members gave approval to the plan.' 8 ' Further-
more, evidence of congressional acquiesence can be found in congres-
sional authorization of the right of the refugee-parolees to seek em-
ployment.
8 2
EQUATING REFUGEE-PAROLEES WITH RESIDENT ALIENS
The constitutional rights which are granted to entrant aliens are
given on the basis of the alien being "within the country."'' While
the degree of protection granted nonimmigrants, undocumented
aliens, and permanent resident aliens varies, 8 4 all three are granted
some measure of protection by the Constitution once they have made
an entry into the United States. 8 ' With respect to aliens, the Con-
stitution is a territorial instrument. It protects those aliens who have
177. See authority cited note 50 supra.
178. 260 F.2d at 614.
179. The Fifth Circuit's ruling suggests that where an individual is not
paroled into this country as part of a program of mass parole for refugees, but
rather is paroled on an individual basis, the parolee is then not classified as an
"invitee" under Paktorovics and is not entitled to a hearing on the revocation of
his parole.
180. See note 155 supra.
181. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees, supra note 1, at 56-57; Bernsen,
Rights of Refugees, 52 INTERPRETER RELEASES 407, 409 (1975).
182. See Bernsen, Leave to Labor, 52 INTERPRETER RELEASES 291, 296 (1975).
See also note 86 supra.
183. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1957); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228
(1925). See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 771 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
184. See text accompanying notes 37-67 supra.
185. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1957).
made an entry into the territory of the United States. 186 An alien
outside the territory of the United States is not entitled to any
fundamental rights under the Constitution.'87
While both the United States government and the court in Pak-
torovics approach the problem of the refugee-parolees' constitu-
tional status from different points of view, both reach essentially the
same conclusion: The Indochinese refugee-parolees are entitled to
some measure of constitutional protection. This conclusion may be
inferred from the past actions of the government that it considers the
Indochinese refugee-parolees to be "within the country" as perma-
nent residents. 88 In addition, the Paktorovics court expressly stated
that refugee-parolees were entitled to constitutional procedural due
process protection in exclusion proceedings.'89
The question arises as to what constitutes "some measure." Based
on the substantially identical nature and needs of the two groups, a
strong argument may be made that refugee-parolees should be grant-
ed the same degree of constitutional protection as permanent resi-
dent aliens. 90 Both groups have been admitted into the United States
for the purpose of resettlement, unlike nonimmigrants and undocu-
186. Id.
187. Id. Note that parolees have been granted some rights-though not all-
under the Constitution. See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
188. See text accompanying notes 147-61 supra.
189. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir.
1958).
190. See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra. To deny refugee-parolees co-
equal constitutional and statutory status with permanent resident aliens could
theoretically result in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion. Refugee-parolees are entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.
The Paktorovics court held that refugee-parolees are entitled to procedural due
process in parole revocations. Conceivably, this naked entitlement to some
constitutional protection may also include within its parameters the right to
equal protection. If so, discrimination between permanent residents and
refugee-parolees would violate equal protection because permanent residents
and refugee-parolees are virtually identical groups. Both are alien groups per-
mitted to settle permanently within the United States. Any discrimination based
on the circumstances of either group's entry into the United States would be
arbitrary, irrational; and unjustifiable. The essential characteristic of each
group is their permanence. They are foreigners entitled to live in the United
States. Whether they were allowed to enter as permanent residents or parolees is
immaterial. After entry, the two groups merge. Any discrimination could not
survive even a minimal scrutiny test. Unequal treatment based on the labels of
permanent resident and parolee would certainly be impermissible. Refugee-
parolees, unlike nonimmigrant and undocumented aliens, may remain perma-
nently within the country while the others may not. This permanence entitles
refugee-parolees to greater protection than the other two groups. Thus, the
refugee-parolees should receive the same protection that permanent residents
have earned by virtue of their permanent nature.
The rebuttal to the above argument lies in the fact that no court has expanded
upon Paktorovics to hold that refugee-parolees are entitled to equal protection
under the Constitution. It is the conclusion of this author that, based on the
reasoning behind the Paktorovics holding, Paktorovics should be so expanded.
162
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mented aliens. Both are entitled to seek employment, unlike nonim-
migrants and undocumented aliens.
THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL ACTION
Without the aid of the courts or Congress in implementing the
above recommendation, the Indochinese refugee-parolees may con-
tinue to be denied the protection of the Constitution under the exist-
ing law. While Paktorovics agreed in principle that refugee-parolees
are indistinguishable from permanent resident aliens, the holding
only extended the constitutional right of procedural due process in
parole revocation proceedings to refugee-parolees. 19' The ruling in
Paktorovics must be expanded to grant refugee-parolees equal con-
stitutional status with permanent resident aliens in all areas, not just
in matters of parole revocations. Judicial or congressional recogni-
tion is needed to effectuate this expansion.
Legislative Goals
There are three proposed avenues open to Congress for alleviating
the refugee-parolee confusion. First, Congress could enact legislation
extending permanent resident constitutional status to any present
and future refugee-parolee meeting the following criteria:
(1) The alien must have fled his homeland under a well-founded
fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality or membership
in a particular social or political group. The alien must be unwilling to
return to his homeland.
92
(2) He must be a member of a mass refugee group. Such a group
must be comprised of refugees fleeing from a similar home and/or
geographical area, and these refugees must be fleeing from persecu-
tion reasonably common to all of them. To qualify as a mass group, it
must be large enough so as to be inadmissible under the section
203(a)(7) conditional entry statute.' 93 This statute can accommodate
191. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir.
1958).
192. See note 90 supra.
193. I. & N. Act § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7) (West Supp. 1977). Section
203(a)(7) provides that:
(7) Conditional entries shall next be made available by the Attorney
General, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe and in a
number not to exceed 6 per centum of the number specified in section
1151(a)(ii) of this title to aliens who satisfy an Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service officer at an examination in any non-Communist or non-
Communist-dominated country, (A) that (i) because of persecution or
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they
have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or
area, or (II) from any country within the general area of the Middle East,
and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on
groups of up to 5,100 in a single year, but it is extremely unlikely that
so large a number of visas would be available.1
9 4
(3) The group must be paroled into the United States as a group
under the section 212(d)(5) 95 parole statute. Finally, the parole must
not have been expressly limited in terms of duration by either Con-
gress or the President.19
Such legislation would protect the Indochinese refugee-parolees in
the event of judicial failure to expand on the Paktorovics holding
97
and would of course benefit future refugee-parolees.
Second, Congress could enact uniform adjustment of status legisla-
tion'9 8 for the present Indochinese refugee-parolees. Adjusting status
would allow the refugee-parolees to benefit from not only the con-
stitutional rights but the statutory rights extended to permanent
resident aliens. These benefits include the ability to have alien rela-
tives given preferential immigration treatment. 9 9 While these statu-
tory benefits are important, they are not as vital as constitutional
account of race, religion or polifical opinion, and (iii) are not nationals of
the countries or areas in which their application for conditional entry is
made; or (B) that they are persons uprooted by catastrophic natural
calamity as defined by the President who are unable to return to their
usual place of abode. For the purpose of the foregoing the term "general
area of the Middle East" means the area between and including (1) Libya
on the west, (2) Turkey on the north, (3) Pakistan on the east, and (4)
Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia on the south: Provided, That immigrant
visas in a number not exceeding one half the number specified in this
paragraph may be made available, in lieu of conditional entries of a like
number, to such aliens who have been continuously physically present
in the United States for a period of at least two years prior to application
for adjustment of status.
194. This is partially the result of the statutory allocation scheme. See note
205 infra. There are other reasons for the unfeasibility of employing § 203(a)(7)
to admit large refugee groups into the United States as conditional entrants. The
main problem centers on the fact that the statute requires the issuance of visas
to the refugees while the more flexible § 212(d)(5) does not. Every time a parolee
already living in the United States uses a § 203(a)(7) visa to adjust his status to
permanent resident, one visa is deducted from the total allotment available that
year to admit refugees as conditional entrants. I. & N. Act § 245(b), 8 U.S.C. §
1255(b) (1970). Coupled with the fact that every refugee-alien from a communist
or Middle Eastern country is competing within his respective hemisphere for the
available visas, the above factors combine to make § 203(a)(7) an ineffective
means of admitting mass refugee groups into the United States. During 1977,
only 600 Indochinese were admitted as conditional entrants during the first six
months of the year. San Diego Union, Jul. 4, 1977, pt. A, at 1, col. 3.
195. I. & N. Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970).
196. The legality of this time limit under the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees depends on the form of action taken upon expiration of the limit. If the
United States prevails upon anoiher nation to invite the refugee-parolees to
come live there, then neither the Protocol nor American immigration laws are
violated. See notes 90 & 124 supra.
197. See text accompanying notes 204-14 infra.
198. Such legislation would permit any member of the Indochinese refugee.
parolee group to adjust his status by a simplified procedure, with no restrictions
in terms of numbers or time.
199. See note 52 supra.
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rights. In the event of a judicial expansion of Paktorovics, it would
be permissible for Congress to refuse to enact uniform adjustment-
of-status legislation. Permanent resident constitutional status is all
to which the Indochinese should be entitled. It would be within the
discretion of Congress to refuse to go further.
2 0
Finally, Congress must consider the question of future mass re-
fugee-parolee groups. This is a very real problem as over 80,000
Indochinese refugees still remain homeless.20 ' Congress has several
alternatives. It may repeal the parole authority completely. Congress
may remove the parole authority from the executive branch and
transfer it to Congress. 20 2 A third alternative would be to enact
legislation granting an automatic option of adjustment of status to
permanent resident upon parole for all future refugee-parolees meet-
ing the criterion noted under the first proposal in this section.23 A
final alternative would consist of placing time limits on future mass
refugee-parolee groups. These time limits would serve to expressly
label the parole as temporary in nature and subject the parolees to
the Leng May Ma ruling.
The Courts
In the past, Congress has enacted uniform adjustment-of-status
legislation to enable the Hungarian, World Refugee Year, and Cuban
refugees to obtain permanent resident status and the resulting con-
stitutional rights. Why is judicial intervention presently needed
when Congress has always acted in the past?
There are two important reasons the Constitution should be judi-
cially extended to the Indochinese and future mass refugee-parolee
groups. First, it is possible Congress will never enact adjustment-of-
status legislation in favor of the Indochinese refugee-parolees.0 4
200. But see note 190 supra.
201. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
202. Congress can regain control of the parole authority by means of its
plenary power over immigration. See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 192-96 supra.
204. House Bills H.R. 13176 and 14447, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), and Senate
Bill S. 2313, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), were introduced during the 94th Con-
gress but lapsed in committee. These bills provided for a retroactive adjustment
of status to permanent resident for the Indochinese refugee-parolees.
There are many reasons why Congress has not enacted such legislation. At the
time of the original parole, congressional failure to act was based on the hostile
mood of the nation toward the massive influx of refugees. See Hearings on
Indochina Refugees, supra note 1, at 24-25 (Ambassador Brown refers to news-
paper headlines proclaiming that 1,000,000 Vietnamese refugees will be dumped
Without such legislation the refugee-parolees would be forced to
follow existing adjustment-of-status procedures.05 There have been
Jin California); id. at 58 (Ambassador Brown refers to public concern over
admitting the Indochinese refugees at a time of economic difficulty); id. at 16
(Congressman Fish refers to the cold American reception of the refugees).
Having only recently extricated itself from an unpopular war in Vietnam, the
American populace in the spring of 1975 did not wish to be reminded of the
Vietnam debacle. Many Americans feared increased job competition. But see
id. at 13-14 (the impact of the Indochinese upon the American job market was
not expected to be severe; of the 130,000 original refugees, approximately 30,000
would be seeking employment). Also feared were the creation of Vietnamese
ghettos and the release of corrupt South Vietnamese officials and war criminals
into American society. See id. at 24-25, 28-30, 77, 88, 100-01. Indeed, an estimated
55,000 to 60,000 refugees live in California, with 20,000 in San Diego. San Diego
Union, Jul. 4, 1977, pt. I, at 1, col. 3. At the present time, there is evidence that key
members of Congress, including Rep. Joshua Eilberg, Chairman of the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, have become highly critical of the
Indochinese parole program. This criticism seems to be based on the fact that
the decision to parole refugee groups is mostly in the hands of the executive
branch, though the concurrence of House and Senate leaders is usually obtained
beforehand. Once the parole is accomplished, however, Congress is left with the
responsibility of appropriating vast sums of resettlement aid for the parolees.
This federal spending is hard for members of Congress to reconcile with their
constituents. The theme of "American first" creeps into play. However, regard-
less of their reasons these key members of Congress have been successful in
blocking the enactment of adjustment-of-status legislation.
205. See I. & N. Act § 245, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West Supp. 1977). This section
sets forth the procedure by which parolees may adjust their status to permanent
resident. The parolee must meet the requirements for admission, be currently
eligible to receive a visa, and be able to convince the Attorney General to
exercise his discretion favorably and grant a visa. The number of visas available
to aliens from countries in the Eastern Hemisphere totals 170,000 per year. Id. §
201(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a). The number of visas available to aliens from the
Western Hemisphere totals 120,000 per year. Id. These visas are allocated among
seven preference categories. The preference system confers priority on aliens
who have specified familial relationships to American citizens and residents, or
who have specified occupational skills. Id. § 203(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a). Parolees
applying for a visa within each preference category must vie with other aliens
from their respective hemisphere (within a 170,000 annual limit for the In-
dochinese) and from their respective homeland. A maximum of 20,000 aliens
from any one country may adjust their status within a given year. Id. § 202(a), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1152(a). See 111 CONG. REc. 21, 589 (1965) (remarks of Congressman
Feighan). Refugee-parolees are generally limited to seeking visas within the
seventh preference, which is the refugee category. This category is limited to
10,200 Eastern Hemisphere refugees per year (6% of 170,000), but only 5,200 of
these may be used for adjustment of status. The other 5,200 are to be used by
conditional entrant refugees. See notes 193 & 194 supra. Also, if a single country
uses up its 20,000 allocation in a single year, that country will be required to
allocate its visas during the succeeding year according to the § 203(a) preference
category percentages. I. & N. Act § 202(e), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152(e) (West Supp. 1977).
Thus, if the particular preference category to which the alien applies has its
supply of visas exhausted, the parolee's application for adjustment of status will
be denied. Similarly, if the 20,000 limit has been attained for the parolee's
country, his application will be denied. The Indochinese refugee-parolees must
compete with all other Eastern Hemisphere aliens. The maximum number of
the Indochinese who could adjust their status each year would be 20,000, but it is
unlikely that such a maximum could be reached because of competition from
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estimates that it would take over twenty-five years 6 before any
significant number of the Indochinese refugee-parolees could adjust
their status to that of permanent resident.0 7 Many of the refugee-
parolees would be ineligible under the present adjustment standards
and thus would be precluded totally from adjusting their status to
that of permanent resident.20 8
The second reason for judicial extension of the'Constitution to
refugee-parolees is that the aliens are left totally unprotected by the
Constitution during the interim between the parole grant and an
actual enactment of adjustment-of-status legislation. If Congress
was to pass adjustment-of-status legislation and make it retroactive
other aliens within each preference category, because of the preference percent-
age requirement that is mandated in years following a full 20,000 allotment,
because of the need to convince the Attorney General to exercise his discretion
favorably, and because of the labor certificate requirement.
Refugee-parolees may qualify for a higher preference (which offers a larger
number of visas per year) by being the unmarried son or daughter of an Ameri-
can citizen, id. § 203(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(1); by being the spouse, unmarried
son or daughter of a permanent resident, id. § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(2);
by being a talented professional, artist or educator, id. § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1153(a)(3); by being the married son or daughter of an American citizen, id. §
203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(4); by being the brother or sister of an American
citizen, id. § 203(a)(5), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(5); or by being able to obtain labor
certification, id. § 203(a)(6), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(6).
A parolee attempting to adjust his status within the § 203(a)(3) or (a)(6) prefer-
ence categories, which cover aliens skilled in the professions, science, art, and
culture, in addition to skilled and unskilled laborers, must obtain a labor certifi-
cation from the Secretary of Labor in order to receive a visa. To obtain a labor
certification, the refugee's job must be one for which there is not a sufficient
number of workers in the United States who are "able, willing, qualified, and
available." Additionally, the refugee cannot become certified if his employment
will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of such workers similar-
ly employed. Id. § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(14). Failure to obtain this
certification will prevent the parolee from adjusting status. The labor certifica-
tion requirement was waived at the time of the parole of the Indochinese, and
they will be exempt from the requirement if they adjust their status under §
203(a)(7). See Rubin, An Overview of the Labor Certification Requirement for
Intending Immigrants, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 76 (1976).
It should be noted that a recent regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (1977), will
permanently exempt from labor certification any refugee-parolee who has been
continuously present physically within the United States for at least two years.
At the present time, it is not clear whether this regulation will exempt refugee-
parolees from labor certification when attempting to adjust their status to
permanent resident within the § 203(a)(3) or (a)(6) preference categories.
206. Bernsen, Rights of Refugees, 52 INTERPRETER RELEASES 407, 409 (1975).
This estimate is based on a maximum of 5,200 refugee-parolees adjusting their
status per year. See note 205 supra.
207. See note 205 supra.
208. Id.
to the date of the original parole, the retroactivity would not provide
true protection. Realistically, some refugee-parolees who are
damaged because they lack constitutional protection2 9 cannot be
made whole by retroactive legislation enacted several years in the
future. The parolee's injury is immediate, and retroactive legislation
does little to compensate for some past injuries.
For example, the refugee-parolee who is ordered excluded without
a hearing and is subsequently deported back to his homeland might
be imprisoned.2 10 Retroactive legislation that would allow the ref-
ugee-parolee to adjust his status had he not been excluded would
not prevent this result. But as a permanent resident, the alien would
be subject to expulsion rather than exclusion proceedings.2 1' The
alien would be entitled to a procedural due process hearing on his
expulsion.21 2 The hearing would have enabled the parolee to ade-
quately present the merits of his case and possibly prevent his depor-
tation.
More than two years have passed since the first parole of the
Indochinese.2"' No adjustment-of-status legislation has been passed.
Three such bills expired in the last Congress. 1 4 It is impossible to tell
how much longer the Indochinese refugee-parolees must wait for
Congress to act.215 The refugee-parolees lack constitutional protec-
tion throughout the delay.
SUMMARY
It is this author's conclusion that the Supreme Court's ruling in
Leng May Ma v. Barber should not be so broadly interpreted as to
encompass refugee-parolees. Refugee-parolees are clearly distin-
guishable from the parolees contemplated by the Leng May Ma
Court. Instead, the Second Circuit's subsequent holding in United
States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff should be controlling. The courts,
however, should expand on the Paktorovics holding and judicially
209. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1957); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228
(1925).
210. See United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir.
1958).
211. I. & N. Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C.A. 1251(a) (West Supp. 1977).
212. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
213. The first parole commenced on April 21, 1975.
214. See note 204 supra.
215. After this Comment went to press, President Carter signed into law an
act of Congress authorizing a grant of permanent resident alien status to the
Indochinese refugees-parolees. The grant covers all the Indochinese paroled
since April 1975, including those boat persons who have yet to arrive in the
United States. This uniform adjustment-of-status act, however, does not protect
members of future refugee-parolee groups. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
145, - Stat. -.
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grant to the present Indochinese refugee-parolees a constitutional
status equivalent to that enjoyed by permanent resident aliens. Fu-
ture refugee-parolee group members should also be judicially grant-
ed such status, unless Congress enacts legislation at the time of
parole specifically denying these refugee-parolees permission to set-
tle permanently within the United States.
From the viewpoint of the Indochinese refugee-parolees, congres-
sional legislation, giving the Indochinese a blanket adjustment-of-
status to permanent resident option, would be the optimum solution.
Such legislation would enable the Indochinese to become eligible for
the statutory benefits as well as the constitutional protections enjoy-
ed by permanent residents. Absent such legislation, however, the
Indochinese should be entitled to at least increased constitutional
protection, be it granted by the courts or Congress.
FRANK SHERMAN CLOWNEY II

